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FIGHTING FOR MARKET SHARE: HOW A TRADE-AT RULE
CAN IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY
MARIA ZYSKIND
INTRODUCTION
The opening bell rang at 9:30 AM, signaling the start of the trading day on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1980. 1 Thousands of traders congregated on the floor, sending an unbridled
energy through the air. 2 Equipped with pen and paper, they shouted,
jostled, and gesticulated as they bargained for prices. 3 They traded
stock in face-to-face transactions, providing a human element to the
market. 4
Fast forward a few decades and trading floors have subdued. 5
Computers have largely replaced boisterous crowds of floor traders
and automation has decreased human interaction. 6 Moreover, new
technology has allowed market participants to trade shares of stock
in milliseconds. 7 Accordingly, computer algorithms dominate the
market, entering and canceling thousands of orders per second. 8
This transformation has taken a heavy toll on exchanges’ market share. Gone are the days where exchanges served as the primary marketplaces for order execution. 9 About eighty percent of
stock trading occurred on the NYSE ten years ago, but only twenty
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1. D.M. Levine, A Day in the Quiet Life of a NYSE Floor Trader, FORTUNE (May 29,
2013, 2:15 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/05/29/a-day-in-the-quiet-life-of-a-nyse-floor-trader/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Edwin Batista, Note, A Shot in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC’s Response to the
Rise of Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 87 (2014).
5. Levine, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Summary of Senate PSI Hearing on Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence,
and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock Markets, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC. (June 17,
2014), http://www.sifma.org/members/hearings.aspx?id=8589949563 [hereinafter Senate PSI
Hearing].
8. AL BROOKS, TRADING PRICE ACTION TRENDS: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE CHARTS
BAR BY BAR FOR THE SERIOUS TRADER (2d ed. 2012).
9. See Jennifer Dean, Note, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences: The Death
of the Specialist, the Rise of High Frequency Trading, & the Problem of Duty-Free Liquidity in
Equity Markets, 8 FIU L. REV. 217, 228 (2012).
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percent occurred there in 2014. 10 Instead of exchanges, many orders now execute on off-exchange venues, which are known as
alternative trading systems (ATSs). ATSs function like exchanges by
matching buyers and sellers to facilitate order execution, but they
can offer price improvement, anonymity, faster execution, and decreased trading costs to investors. 11
New technology and regulatory changes have significantly increased the prevalence of off-exchange trading, which poses distinct
problems to investors. About forty percent of stock trading occurred
on off-exchange venues in 2014. 12 This number includes nearly all
of the orders that mom and pop investors send their brokers. 13 Most
of these individuals do not know where their orders execute or
whether they receive the best execution. On one hand, brokers can
route orders to off-exchange trading venues that offer investors price
improvement and decreased trading costs. 14 On the other hand,
brokers can route orders to venues that offer themselves the highest
rebates.
Unlike many mom and pop investors, exchanges are painfully
aware of the consequences associated with off-exchange trading.
Indeed, off-exchange trading has cut into the profit and market share
of exchanges. As a result, major exchanges like Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE), NYSE 15, and Nasdaq are pushing to overhaul the
stock market and decrease off-exchange trading. All three have publicly voiced support for a trade-at rule. 16 While the details of a tradeat rule vary depending on the proposal, the aim of the trade-at rule is
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 213 Side B
12/28/2015 14:43:02

10. Eric Garcia, This NYSE Plan Could Help Retail Investors, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 24,
2013,
12:08
PM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-nyse-plan-could-help-retailinvestors-2014-12-24.
11. See Dean, supra note 9, at 234–35.
12. John McCrank, Dark Markets may be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/us-marketsdarkpools-analysis-idUSBREA3605M20140407.
13. Sarah Lynch & John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Eyes Test that May Lead to Shift
Away
from
‘Dark
Pools’,
REUTERS
(Apr.
11,
2014,
5:35
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/us-sec-darkmarkets-idUSBREA3A0CP20140411.
14. Dean, supra note 9, at 235.
15. ICE closed on its acquisition of NYSE’s parent company, NYSE Euronext, in November 2013. ICE Closes on $11B Acquisition of NYSE Euronext, YAHOO FIN. (Nov. 13, 2013,
11:57
AM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ice-closes-11b-acquisition-nyse135835485.html?nf=1&bypass=true.
16. Dave Michaels, Exchanges Get Test to Curb Dark Trading in SEC Program,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 24, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0624/exchanges-get-test-to-curb-dark-trading-in-sec-program.html; Bradley Hope, NYSE,
Nasdaq Join to Push for Trading Rule, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2014, 6:46 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304020104579431300583920332.
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to decrease off-exchange trading. 17 In practice, a trade-at rule has
the potential to force brokers to send more orders to exchanges and
push market share away from off-exchange venues. 18
This paper analyzes the effects of off-exchange trading and the
implementation of a trade-at rule as a remedy for the consequences
associated with off-exchange trading. Section I analyzes the history
behind the increase in off-exchange trading, focusing on the technological and regulatory changes that gave rise to the current fragmented market structure. It also evaluates the benefits and
consequences of off-exchange trading by analyzing its effect on
transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, liquidity, and price. Moreover, it
is necessary to understand the current proposals addressing offexchange trading and the stakeholders behind each proposal. Section II discusses proposals by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), ICE, Nasdaq, and BATS Global Markets (BATS) that
include a trade-at rule, decrease in access fees, block trading exemption, or elimination of the maker-taker system. As a solution to
the increase of off-exchange trading, Section III argues for a program that incorporates a trade-at rule, a decreased cap on access
fees, a variable access fee and rebate schedule, and a block trading
exemption. Of note, empirical evidence is the best measure of success for any program. Therefore, Section IV discusses metrics to
use in evaluating the success of any such initiative. This article suggests evaluating market share, bid-ask spreads, and price to determine whether the current market structure is more efficient with a
trade-at rule.

The last several decades have seen the transformation from an
exchange-dominated market to a fragmented market where trading
is dispersed among various locales. In determining the need for a
trade-at rule, it is necessary to understand the technology and regulations that spurred off-exchange trading and the impact of offexchange trading on the market.
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17. See ROBERT P. BARTLETT & JUSTIN MCCRARY, DARK TRADING AT THE MIDPOINT:
PRICING RULES, ORDER FLOW AND PRICE DISCOVERY 4 (2015); Amy Kwan, Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark, 35 AUTOMATED TRADER MAGAZINE 34, 36 (2015).
18. Michaels, supra note 16; Hope, supra note 16.
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A. Technology and Changing Regulations
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19. Batista, supra note 4, at 87.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 87–88.
23. Id. at 88.
24. Nathan D. Brown, Note, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms
and the Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209, 211
(2012).
25. Batista, supra note 4, at 88–89.
26. ECNs/Alternative
Trading
Systems,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrecn.shtml (last modified Nov. 4, 2005).
27. Id.
28. Ian Poirier, Note, High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural Weaknesses in the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
445, 449–50 (2012).
29. Dean, supra note 9, at 234.
30. Id. at 233–34.
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Before computers dominated the stock market, humans traded
stock on exchange floors in face-to-face transactions. 19 To trade on
the floor, buyers and sellers purchased seats and become exchange
members. 20 A market maker—a type of exchange member—served
as an intermediary between an exchange and the public. 21 Market
makers executed orders for investors and profited from the difference in the price they paid for a stock and the price they charged to
process investor orders. 22
The need for human intermediaries diminished as computers
decreased in cost and computer-based trading increased in popularity in the 1990s. 23 Namely, electronic communications networks
(ECNs) gained market share in the 1990s. 24 An ECN is a type of
ATS that matches buyers and sellers with computer algorithms and
allows firms to execute trades without intermediaries. 25 An ECN allows subscribers to place trades directly on its platform. 26 It posts
orders for subscribers to view and automatically submits matching
orders for execution. 27 ECNs can be more attractive than exchanges
because they offer lower fees, faster trade execution, and rebates
for providing liquidity. 28 As ECNs gained popularity, they chipped
away at exchanges’ dominance of the market.
In 1999, the SEC passed Regulation Alternative Trading Systems (Reg ATS), making the marketplace more favorable towards
ATSs. 29 Reg ATS allowed ATSs to register as broker-dealers instead of exchanges, which are considerably more expensive to create and are subject to stricter regulation than broker-dealers. 30
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31. Id.
32. Batista, supra note 4, at 89.
33. Matthew Philips, High-Frequency Trading’s Rise and Rise, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 4,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-04/high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-rise.
34. Kambiz Foroohar, Trading Pennies Into $7 Billion Drives High-Frequency’s Cowboys,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-10-06/tradingpennies-into-7-billion-profit-drives-high-frequency-s-new-cowboys.
35. Michael McGowan, Note, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use
and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶12 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to Light-Speed Trading,
WIRED (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff_wallstreet_trading/all/.
39. Id.
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Accordingly, Reg ATS was a major victory for ATSs by allowing
them to carry out traditional exchange functions with less expense
and regulation. 31 Due to automation and Reg ATS, the market had
an alternative to exchange-based trading and, as a result, exchanges no longer served as the most attractive execution venues.
This use of automation and computer algorithms to match orders in ATSs gradually evolved into high-frequency trading (HFT). 32
HFT involves running complex computer algorithms to electronically
buy and sell large amounts of securities at high speeds. 33 In 2001,
the SEC moved to decimalization in the stock market, inadvertently
encouraging HFT. Decimalization meant that stock exchanges had
to price stocks in pennies rather than fractions. Before decimalization, the minimum price change between shares of stock was 1/8th of
a dollar, so a share of stock could be priced at “$129, $129.125,
$129.25 and so on.” 34
The move to decimalization narrowed bid-ask spreads, limiting
the ability of market makers to compete. 35 Market makers continually buy and sell securities, aiming to profit off the bid-ask spread,
which is the difference between the price a seller will accept and the
buyer will pay. Because decimalization decreased spreads from
fractions of a dollar to a penny, the minimum profit that a market
maker could make off a trade decreased. 36 To make the same
amount of money, market makers had to trade significantly more
stock. 37 Unlike market makers, high-frequency traders rapidly executed thousands of orders with the use of high speed algorithms,
reaping profits off penny spreads. 38 Thus, decimalization encouraged high-frequency traders at the cost of market makers. 39
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41.
42.
43.
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Batista, supra note 4, at 84 .
Id.
Id.
See GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK
POOLS IN EQUITY TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2014).
44. Poirier, supra note 28, at 449.
45. Id.
46. Craig Pirrong, Financial Exchanges: Competition and Vertical Integration in Financial
Exchanges, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 90, 94 (2011).
47. Id.
48. Batista, supra note 4, at 90.
49. Id. at 90–91.
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HFT presented problems for institutional investors, who trade
large amounts of securities at a time. Namely, high-frequency traders used computer programs to detect patterns signaling a large
trade. 40 Before institutional investors could complete their trades,
high-frequency traders executed their own orders in front of the institutional investors’ orders. 41 This strategy known as front-running
moved the price in favor of high-frequency traders and against institutional investors by making a buy order more expensive and a sell
order less profitable for institutional investors. 42
In 2005, the SEC adopted Regulation National Market System
(Reg NMS), which again increased the popularity of ATSs and decreased institutional investors’ ability to hide from high-frequency
traders. 43 Reg NMS aimed to connect various trading venues into a
linked trading network, or a national market system. 44 It required
exchanges to route orders to the trading venue with the best displayed price, regardless of the venue where the order was filed. 45
Reg NMS decreased exchanges’ stronghold over the market by
ensuring that orders were routed to the venue with the best displayed price, which was not necessarily an exchange. 46 Before Reg
NMS, the NYSE’s market share was about eighty-five percent; however, after Reg NMS, the NYSE’s market share plummeted to
around thirty percent. 47
In addition to order-routing requirements, Reg NMS implemented certain disclosure requirements that limited institutional investors’
ability to hide from HFT. Before Reg NMS, to avoid front-running by
high-frequency traders, institutional investors disclosed the full
scope of their trades at the last minute. 48 They engaged in block
trading, arranging “secret” trades where details were revealed after
order placement. 49 However, Reg NMS required exchanges “to collect and publish the quotations for the securities posted in their ven-
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50. Id. at 91.
51. GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK POOLS IN
EQUITY TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2014).
51. Batista, supra note 4, at 84.
52. Id.
53. Batista, supra note 4, at 92–93.
54. Id. at 92.
55. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 51.
56. See id. at 1.
57. Dean, supra note 9, at 235.
58. John McCrank, Dark Markets may be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/us-marketsdarkpools-analysis-idUSBREA3605M20140407.
59. BLACKROCK, US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014).
60. Garcia, supra note 10.
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ues . . . [and] forced all trading venues to monitor stock prices constantly on an electronic ticker tape.” 50 These disclosure requirements decreased the ability of institutional investors to hide from
high-frequency traders who jumped in front of their orders, effectively increasing the price of buy orders and decreasing the price of sell
orders. 51
As a result, institutional investors sought shelter from frontrunning in dark pools. A dark pool is another type of ATS that
matches orders without publishing pre-trade bids and offers. Dark
pools publicize price information after a trade is completed. 52 A
loophole in Reg ATS propelled dark pools to popularity in the latter
half of the 2000s. 53 The loophole “allowed trading with hidden
quotes as long as the volume of trades on a stock did not exceed
five percent of the national trading volume in that stock.” 54 As a result, investors could use dark pools to trade large blocks of securities anonymously and avoid alerting high-frequency traders of their
actions. 55 Thus, exchanges lost market share to ATSs, as more investors chose dark pools for order execution. 56
The combination of technological advancements, Reg ATS,
decimalization, and Reg NMS led to the rise of ATSs and offexchange trading. 57 For instance, forty percent of stock trading in
the United States took place in off-exchange venues in 2014, a large
increase from sixteen percent in 2008. 58 Today, when executing
orders, investors can choose from several ECNs, more than forty
dark pools, and thirteen exchanges. 59 The dominance of exchanges
has fallen because trading is dispersed across various venues.
About eighty percent of stock trading occurred on the NYSE ten
years ago but only twenty percent occurred there in 2014. 60 Current-
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ly, no exchange has a stronghold on the stock market. 61 About twenty percent of stock trading occurs on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and BATS,
respectively. 62
Finally, in 2010, the SEC sought comment on a trade-at rule
aimed at shifting trading back to exchanges. 63 The proposal sparked
considerable commentary among the industry and the SEC ultimately did not implement the rule. 64 However, the trade-at rule is again
up for discussion as the SEC and ICE have incorporated trade-at
rules into proposals for stock market reform. The SEC incorporated
a trade-at rule as part of its study on trading increments. 65 Meanwhile, ICE proposed a trade-at rule in combination with decreased
access fees to drive orders back to exchanges. 66 Although Bloomberg and Reuters have cited Nasdaq as a proponent of a trade-at
rule, Nasdaq has its own proposal to minimize off-exchange trading. 67 Its proposal uses decreased access fees to move trading back
to exchanges without a trade-at rule. 68
B. Off-Exchange Trading and Market Quality
Naturally, the market participants that a trade-at rule benefits
tend to voice support in its favor. Meanwhile, those disadvantaged
by a trade-at rule tend to voice opposition. Since exchanges have
lost market share to off-exchange venues, it is no surprise that ICE,

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 216 Side B
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61. Bradley Hope, BATS Opposes NYSE Owner’s Stock-Market Reform Plan, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 18, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bats-opposes-nyse-owners-stockmarket-reform-plan-1418933375.
62. Id.
63. Thoughts On Trade-At Rule, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://blog.themistrading.com/thoughts-on-trade-at-rule/.
64. Nina Mehta, Morgan Stanley Changing Dark Pool to Attract Bigger Orders,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201109-21/morgan-stanley-changing-dark-pool-rules-in-attempt-to-increase-order-sizes.
65. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PLAN TO IMPLEMENT A TICK SIZE PILOT PROGRAM
SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO RULE 608 OF
REGULATION NMS UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 15–16 (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tick-size-pilot-plan-final.pdf.
66. Larry Tabb, The Grand Bargain: A Great Start, But Don’t Hold Your Breath,
TABBFORUM (Jan. 6, 2015), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/the-grand-bargain-a-great-start-butdon’t-hold-your-breath; Bradley Hope & Scott Patterson, NYSE Plan Would Revamp Trading,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/intercontinental-exchangeproposing-major-stock-market-overhaul-1418844900.
67. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 16.
68. Here Is What You Need to Know About The Nasdaq Experimental Pricing Schedule,
THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015), http://blog.themistrading.com/here-is-what-you-need-toknow-about-the-nasdaq-experimental-pricing-schedule/ [hereinafter Here Is What You Need].
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NYSE, and Nasdaq have voiced support for a trade-at rule. 69 In contrast, brokers associated with ATSs are generally opposed to a
trade-at rule because it forces orders away from them and cuts into
profits. 70 Therefore, it is essential to understand the effect of offexchange trading on the market to come to an objective conclusion
on the utility of a trade-at rule. This section discusses the effect of
off-exchange trading on transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, liquidity,
and price.
1. Transaction Costs

12/28/2015 14:43:02

69. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 16.
70. Matt Levine, Levine on Wall Street: Rigging FX and Defining Insider Trading,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-1111/levine-on-wall-street-rigging-fx-and-defining-insider-trading.
71. Anya Aratovskaya, How Forex Traders Can Account for Unexpected Costs, BOS.
TECH. BLOG (June 12, 2013), http://www.bostontechnologies.com/blog/How-Forex-TradersCan-Account-For-Unexpected-Costs.
72. JAROSLAW MORAWSKI, INVESTMENT DECISIONS ON ILLIQUID ASSETS 48 (1st ed. 2008).
73. Gary Stone, The Maker-Taker Model and Access Fees: It’s Time for the SEC to
Correct
the
Prisoner’s
Dilemma,
BLOOMBERG: EQUITIES
(Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blog/maker-taker-access-fees/.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Bob Pisani, Wall Street Trade Group Urges New Trading Rules, CNBC (July 14,
2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101834667.
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Off-exchange trading has benefited the market by decreasing
transaction costs; however, it has increased the conflicts of interest
that brokers face when choosing execution venues. First, decreased
transaction costs benefit investors. Transaction costs are the expenses associated with buying or selling securities. 71 Examples include commissions paid to brokers or the difference between the
price to buy and sell. 72 Further, because many exchanges employ a
maker-taker system, ATSs can serve as less expensive execution
venues for brokers. 73 In a maker-taker system, market participants
that respond to buy or sell orders are “takers” of liquidity and pay a
fee to access the liquidity on exchanges. 74 In contrast, market participants that add liquidity, or post orders that are not immediately executable, are “makers” of liquidity and receive rebates. 75 Access fees
and rebates can serve as incentives for brokers to send orders to
less expensive, non-exchange venues.
Accordingly, off-exchange venues serve a valuable role in decreasing the cost of trading by allowing brokers to avoid exchanges’

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 217 Side B

12/28/2015 14:43:02

14 ZYSKIND FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

420

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

12/10/2015 11:35 AM

[Vol 91:1

access fees. 76 To avoid these fees, brokers can send orders to venues like ECNs or dark pools. 77 They can also fill orders from the
brokerage firm’s own inventory, a process called internalization. 78
Moreover, brokers can sell the orders they receive from investors to
wholesale brokers in a process called payment for order flow. 79
Many wholesale brokers in turn internalize or route the orders elsewhere for execution, often to an ATS. 80
On the other hand, the execution quality of investor orders can
be impaired when brokers face conflicts of interest in choosing between the multitude of off-exchange venues. 81 Access fees, rebates,
internalization, and payment for order flow incentivize brokers to
preference their own financial interest above the customers’ interest. 82 For example, a broker may choose a specific trading venue for
order execution because it offers higher rebates, even though an
exchange would offer the customer better execution quality. 83 In
terms of execution quality, the broker’s choice in venue may influence execution speed and the number of shares that receive price
improvement.
Although brokers have a duty of best execution to their customers, it is not strong enough to prevent conflicts of interest. The duty
of best execution is a “loose, imprecise, principles-based standard
that is designed to offer flexibility, with a certain degree of subjectivity for the broker.” 84 In considering best execution, brokers consider
factors such as price, order size, execution speed, and certainty of
execution. 85 However, recent case law does not reflect these factors
and, instead, revolves around obvious and continual violations of the
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 217 Side B
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76. CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS INST., TRADE-AT RULES IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: A MIXED
BAG
FOR
INVESTORS
1
(2014),
https://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/Documents/Policy%20Brief_Trade-at%20Rules.pdf.
77. Dave Michaels, NYSE Proposes Lower Access Fees to get More Trading,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 13, 2013, 8:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0513/nyse-proposes-lower-access-fees-to-get-more-trading-on-exchanges.
78. Market Centers: Buying and Selling Stock, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/market.htm (last modified Oct. 15, 2012).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2.
84. MICAH HAUPTMAN, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., WHITE PAPER: TOWARD A U.S. EQUITY
MARKET
STRUCTURE
THAT
SERVES
ALL
INVESTORS
10
(2014),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA-Market-Structure-White-Paper.pdf.
85. Id.
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duty of best execution. 86 Customers are hurt when brokers favor
their own interest, as customer orders can experience a lower probability of being filled and an overall decrease in execution quality. 87
2. Bid-Ask Spreads

12/28/2015 14:43:02

86. Id.
87. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 2.
88. See
Morningstar
Investing
Glossary:
Bid-Ask
Spread,
MORNINGSTAR,
http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/bid-ask-spread.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
89. Id.
90. STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW PART I: MARKET FRAGMENTATION 11 (2013).
91. HAUPTMAN, supra note 84.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Sandler O’Neill
& Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference, Enhancing Our Equity Market
Structure
(June
5,
2014)
(on
file
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.VHDMQYvF_4A).
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There is no consensus on the impact that off-exchange trading
has on bid-ask spreads as different studies yield conflicting results.
Nevertheless, investors prefer narrower bid-ask spreads, meaning
the difference between the price at which the seller will sell and the
buyer will buy is minimal. 88 With narrow spreads, the buyer and seller will generally agree on what the correct price of a stock should
be. 89 However, where spreads are wide, costs are greater because
a buyer or seller must concede more to enter or exit a trade.
Certain empirical evidence shows a correlation between dark
trading and wider bid-ask spreads. A 2011 study by Rutgers University Professor Daniel Weaver examined trading in over 4,000 stocks
and found a correlation between trading in dark pools and wider bidask spreads. 90 Weaver conducted another study in 2014 examining
trade data from dark pools, ECNs, and broker-dealer internalizers. 91
The study similarly found that off-exchange trading is associated
with wider spreads. 92
On the other hand, in 2012, a CFA Institute study concluded
that varying amounts of dark trading, based on market capitalization,
can narrow bid-ask spreads. 93 Although there is a point at which
trading in dark venues widens bid-ask spreads, 94 SEC Chair Mary
Jo White publicly stated that “spreads between bid and ask prices
for the broader market . . . are as narrow as they have ever been.” 95
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Thus, whether off-exchange trading has negatively impacted bid-ask
spreads remains an open question.
3. Liquidity
By taking displayed liquidity away from exchanges, offexchange trading has the potential to impair the price discovery process and even cause inaccurate stock prices. The price discovery
process is a method of determining stock prices based on supply
and demand. 96 Publicly posted bids and offers contribute to price
discovery because they express the market’s interest in a stock.
Accordingly, when significant amounts of trading occur on dark trading venues that do not publicize pre-trade information, publicly posted prices may not be an accurate measure of the market’s
interest. 97 Investors, thus, may not receive the best price possible. 98
Further, instead of aiding in the price discovery process, dark markets copy the prices set by exchanges; however, these prices may
not be an accurate measure of supply and demand. 99
4. Price

12/28/2015 14:43:02

96. BLACKROCK, ETFS HELP IMPROVE MARKET STABILITY: A CLOSER LOOK AT FIXED
INCOME ETF BEHAVIOR DURING RECENT BOND MARKET MOVEMENT 4 (2014),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/whitepaper/etfs-help-improve-marketstability-october-2014.pdf.
97. ANA AVRAMOVIC, CREDIT SUISSE, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE DARK? TRADING OFFEXCHANGE 1 (2012).
98. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13.
99. Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 399, 419 (2002).
100. Hope, supra note 16.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Off-exchange trading venues can benefit investors by offering
better prices and providing a haven from high-frequency traders.
Although ATSs can offer improved prices, such price improvement
may not be large. 100 For instance, if the best price listed on an exchange is $20, an ATS can offer $20.0001, an improvement of
$0.0001. 101 Such a price improvement results in minimal savings to
investors. Nevertheless, ATSs argue that any price improvement, no
matter how small, benefits investors. 102
Dark pools also provide institutional investors an escape from
high-frequency traders, who can move stock prices against institu-
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tional investors by front-running their orders. By publicizing price
information after the completion of a trade, dark pools minimize information leakage, hindering the ability of high-frequency traders to
detect large orders right before their submission. 103 However, highfrequency traders frequent some dark pools, front-running orders
and increasing the cost of trading for investors. 104
II. TRADE-AT RULE
Regulators and exchanges have proposed different programs to
address the increase in off-exchange trading. The SEC’s Tick Size
Pilot Program subjects a group of securities to the trade-at rule. 105
ICE’s “grand bargain” proposes a combination of a trade-at rule with
a decrease in access fees. 106 Nasdaq’s proposal, on the other hand,
tests a decrease in access fees without a trade-at rule. 107 To evaluate the merits, it is important to understand the stakeholders that
support and oppose each program. Therefore, this section discusses the SEC’s Tick Size Pilot Program, ICE’s “grand bargain,” and
Nasdaq’s program. This section also contemplates the current market structure without a trade-at rule. Finally, this section evaluates
the impact of the trade-at rule in Canada and Australia’s markets.
A. Tick Size Pilot Program
On June 24, 2014, the SEC ordered a group of exchanges 108
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) to de37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 219 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

103. Market Structure: Ensuring Orderly, Efficient, Innovative and Competitive Markets for
Issuers and Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 15 (2012) (statement of
Duncan Niederauer, Chief Exec. Officer, NYSE Euronext).
104. Jim Edwards, How Knowledge of Credit Suisse’s Dark Pool for High-Frequency
Trading Leaked Out on LinkedIn, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014, 1:11 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisses-dark-pool-for-high-frequency-trading-leakedon-linkedin-2014-4.
105. Supriya Kurane, SEC Asks Exchanges, FINRA to Submit “Tick Size” Pilot Plan,
REUTERS (June 25, 2014, 3:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/secpilotprogram-trading-idUSL4N0P61HV20140625.
106. Tabb, supra note 66; Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
107. Angela Chen, Nasdaq Launches Lower Access Fee Program, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2,
2015, 9:03 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-launches-lower-access-fee-program1422884966.
108. The exchanges named are the BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS Y-Exchange, Inc., Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., EDGX Exchange, Inc., The Nasdaq Stock
Market LLC, Nasdaq OMX BX, Nasdaq OMX Phlx, National Stock Exchange, Inc., New York
Stock Exchange LLC, NYSE Arca, Inc., and NYSE MKT LLC. Order Directing the Exchanges
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velop and file with the SEC “a national market system plan to implement a pilot program that, among other things, would widen the
quoting and trading increments for certain small capitalization
stocks.” 109 Known as the Tick Size Pilot Plan, this pilot analyzes the
impact of wider tick sizes, or wider minimum quoting increments, for
stocks of some smaller companies. 110 Namely, it tests the effects of
trading stocks in five-cent increments instead of current one-cent
increments. 111 On August 25, 2014, the exchanges and FINRA filed
with the SEC a proposed one-year plan to implement the pilot, which
was published for comment in the Federal Register on November 7,
2014. 112 The SEC modified several provisions of the plan, taking
into account input from commenters, and approved an updated version on May 6, 2015. 113 The pilot is scheduled to start by May 6,
2016 and will run for two years instead of one. 114
The pilot divides stocks into a control group and three test
groups, subjecting one test group to a trade-at rule. 115 The trade-at
rule in the initial version proposed by the exchanges and FINRA
required ATSs to execute orders with significant price improvement,
meaning either five cents greater than the current best bid and ask
or at the midpoint of the best bid and ask. 116
The trade-at rule in the finalized version prevents price matching by a trading venue that is not quoting at the protected bid or of-

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 219 Side B
12/28/2015 14:43:02

and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size Pilot Plan, 79 Fed. Reg.
36840, 36848 (June 30, 2014).
109. Joint Industry Plans; Order Approving the National Market System Plan To Implement a Tick Size Pilot Program by BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS YExchange, Inc., Chicago
Stock Exchange, Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., EDGX Exchange, Inc., Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc., NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, The Nasdaq Stock
Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange LLC, NYSE MKT LLC, and NYSE Arca, Inc., as
Modified by the Commission, for a Two-Year Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 27513, 27515 (May 13,
2015) [hereinafter Tick Size Pilot Program].
110. Grant Vingoe et al., SEC Approves Tick Size Pilot to Assess Impact on Smaller
Companies,
NORTON
ROSE
FULBRIGHT:
BLOG
NETWORK
(May
7,
2015),
http://www.regulationtomorrow.com/us/sec-approves-tick-size-pilot-to-assess-impact-onsmaller-companies/.
111. Kurane, supra note 105.
112. Tick Size Pilot Program, supra note 109, at 27514.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick Size
Impact
for
Smaller
Companies
(May
6,
2015)
(on
file
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-82.html).
115. Tick Size Pilot Program, supra note 109, at 27517.
116. Ed Beeson, Wall Street Assails Tick-Size Study’s Dark Pool Treatment, LAW360 (Dec.
23, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607471/wall-street-assails-tick-size-studys-dark-pool-treatment; Kwan, supra note 17, at 36; Tick Size Pilot Program, supra note 109, at
27538.
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fer. 117 Price matching refers to the practice of firms who internalize
customer orders and execute them at the best publicly available bid
or offer price regardless of their own quotations. 118 A protected bid
or offer is defined in Rule 611 of Reg NMS as a quotation that is
“immediately and automatically accessible and be the best bid or
best offer of a national securities exchange or national securities
association.” 119 Thus, a trading venue cannot execute from its own
reserves without first routing to venues with displayed quotations
and taking out the shares at the displayed quotation. 120 However,
where a trading venue displays a protected bid or offer, it can price
match up to the number of shares displayed at the protected
price. 121 Exceptions to the trade-at rule in the pilot include retail orders with price improvement and block trades. 122 Namely, retail orders must have a price improvement of $0.005 more than the best
protected bid or ask. 123 Block trades are defined as orders with at
least 5,000 shares or with at least $100,000 in market value. 124
Although the approved pilot incorporates a trade-at rule, Stephen Luparello, the SEC’s Director of Trading and Markets, has
publicly stated that the pilot is not a test for the trade-at rule; instead,
it includes a trade-at rule to provide “a more complete picture of the
market.” 125 In support, he further stated, “If we were trying to figure
out trade-at, the illiquid end of the market would not be where we
want to play.” 126 Luparello’s statements, however, have not prevented proponents and critics from voicing their opinions on the trade-at
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 220 Side A
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117. Vingoe et al., supra note 110.
118. Special Study: Payment for Order Flow and Internalization in the Options Markets,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Dec.
2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ordpay.htm#PAYMENT.
119. Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 611 and Rule 610 of
Regulation
NMS,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/nmsfaq610-11.htm (last updated June 8, 2007).
120. Kevin Foley, 10 Words that Could Subvert the Tick Pilot, TABB FORUM (Aug. 28,
2014),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/10wordsthatcouldsinkthetickpilot?print_preview=true&single=tru
e.
121. Vingoe et al., supra note 110.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Rob Tricchinelli, Gallagher Warns of Bond ‘Liquidity Cliff,’ Regulators Talk Trade-At,
Algo Registration, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. REG. & L. REP. (Oct. 6, 2014); David Michaels &
Sam Mamudi, Brokers Attack SEC’s Plan as Trojan Horse, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 10, 2014,
6:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-11/brokers-attack-sec-s-plan-astrojan-horse-designed-to-hurt-them.
126. Tricchinelli, supra note 125.
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Michaels, supra note 16; Tricchinelli, supra note 125; Hope, supra note 16.
See Hope, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ANA AVRAMOVIC, CREDIT SUISSE, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE DARK? TRADING OFFEXCHANGE 1 (2012).
133. See Michaels, supra note 16.
134. Letter from Micah Hauptman, Fin. Serv. Couns., Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Brent
Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 22, 2014).
135. Id.
136. Hope, supra note 16.
137. Id.
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rule as some fear this rule might be proposed for the entire market if
it proves successful in the pilot. In effect, the pilot has launched a
debate over market structure. ICE, NYSE, and Nasdaq have voiced
their support for a trade-at rule. 127 In contrast, large brokers whose
business benefits from off-exchange trading tend to voice opposition
to the trade-at rule. 128
The collaboration between NYSE and Nasdaq is uncommon
since exchanges normally compete for market share. 129 The increase in off-exchange trading, however, has given them a common
goal in the form of a trade-at rule, which would draw orders back to
them. 130 In support of a trade-at rule, exchange officials contend that
ATSs take market share from exchanges by executing trades with
minimal price improvement, often in fractions of a penny. 131 Moreover, since dark venues do not publicize pre-trade information, they
do not contribute to the price discovery process; thus, at a certain
point, publicly posted prices may not be an accurate measure of the
market’s interest. 132 Accordingly, the trade-at rule in the pilot preferences displayed liquidity over non-displayed liquidity, pushing some
orders to exchanges where they could aid in the price discovery
process. 133 Additionally, it encourages aggressive quoting, or quoting at higher buy prices or lower sell prices, rather than passive
price matching. 134 Aggressive quoting can promote price competition
and narrow spreads, ultimately lowering investors’ costs. 135
In contrast, large brokers tend to oppose the trade-at rule because it would prevent them from internalizing certain orders or routing them to off-exchange venues. 136 A trade-at rule would subject
brokers to access fees by forcing them to route orders to exchanges. 137 It would also prevent them from price matching unless they
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display the best bid or offer. 138 Such a requirement is particularly
burdensome for dark pools, who do not reveal quotes. 139 Moreover,
a trade-at rule could limit the ability of ATSs to compete for trades,
and, as a result, increase trading costs that would be passed down
to investors. 140
B. The “Grand Bargain”
In late 2014, Jeff Sprecher, the Chief Executive of ICE, publicly
presented a proposal for a “grand bargain” between exchanges and
Wall Street banks. 141 Under the proposal, exchanges lower access
fees from thirty cents per 100 shares to five cents per 100 shares,
and, in exchange, banks accept the trade-at rule. 142 The proposal
encourages banks to trade on exchanges by making it less expensive to do so. For instance, with lower access fees, a broker has
less incentive to avoid routing orders to exchanges. 143
Another key feature of the grand bargain is to eliminate makertaker pricing. 144 As mentioned above, in a maker-taker system, market participants that respond to buy or sell orders “take” liquidity and
pay a fee for access. 145 Market participants that post orders that are
not immediately executable “provide” liquidity and receive rebates. 146 Thus, eliminating the maker-taker model means prohibiting
trading venues from having different fees and rebates for “takers”
and “makers” of liquidity. 147
Although no tests are scheduled for this program yet, it has
gained support from several industry participants. 148 Again, ICE,
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 221 Side A
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138. Letter from James P. Selway III, Managing Dir. and Head of Electronic Brokerage,
ITG Inc., to Brent Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 5, 2015) (on file at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-657/4657-91.pdf).
139. Id.
140. Ed Beeson, Wall Street Assails Tick-Size Study’s Dark Pool Treatment, LAW360
(Dec. 23, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607471/wall-street-assails-tick-sizestudy-s-dark-pool-treatment.
141. Tabb, supra note 66; Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
142. Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
143. Tabb, supra note 66.
144. ICE’s Six Recommendations for Reforming Markets, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Dec.
18, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/12/18/ices-six-recommendationsfor-reforming-markets/ [hereinafter ICE’s Six Recommendations].
145. Id.
146. Id.; Bob Pisani, Wall Street Trade Group Urges New Trading Rules, CNBC (July 14,
2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101834667.
147. ICE’s Six Recommendations, supra note 144.
148. Tabb, supra note 66.
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149. Matt Levine, NYSE’s Grand Bargain Just Might Work: Matt Levine, TRADERS MAG.
(Dec. 23, 2014), http://repubhub.icopyright.net/freePost.act?tag=3.8154?icx_id=113276.
150. ICE’s Six Recommendations, supra note 144.
151. Deconstructing the ‘Grand Bargain’, MARKETS MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://marketsmedia.com/deconstructing-grand-bargain/.
152. Bradley Hope, ICE Has Unlikely Ally on Trading Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21,
2014,
7:40
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ice-has-unlikely-ally-on-trading-proposal1419208856.
153. See ICE’s Six Recommendations, supra note 144.
154. Id.
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NYSE, and Nasdaq have publicly voiced support for the grand bargain. 149 Naturally, exchanges support a program that aims to bring
order flow to them. This program, however, has the potential to cut
into the revenue of exchanges through decreased access fees. Decreased rebates can also disincentivize market participants from
posting orders on exchanges. Nevertheless, the grand bargain argues that reduced access fees in combination with a trade-at rule
provide sufficient incentive to draw order flow to exchanges. 150
In addition to exchanges, various industry participants support
ICE’s grand bargain. First, the grand bargain decreases access fees
and makes routing to exchanges less expensive, which wins support
from many broker-dealers who want to avoid access fees. 151 Moreover, it exempts block trades from the trade-at requirement; therefore,
industry participants whose business focuses on block trades face
less impact. Indeed, the head of market structure of Liquidnet Holdings LLC, a dark-pool operator whose focus is block trades, voiced
support for the proposal. 152 Further, the grand bargain can benefit
those on the buy-side of the industry by diminishing conflicts of interest through the elimination of the maker-taker model. Banning
maker-taker means there is less incentive to route to ATSs over
exchanges, which diminishes conflicts of interest in the routing process. 153
Interestingly, Credit Suisse, which operates the largest dark
pool, supports this proposal. 154 Credit Suisse’s motivation for supporting the grand bargain is unclear, although it may signify that the
regulatory scrutiny and expense of operating a dark pool are becoming too costly. Nevertheless, Credit Suisse’s support bolsters ICE’s
proposal and may encourage support from other industry participants.
In contrast, other market participants voice opposition to the
grand bargain, fearing it will harm investors. BATS’ former CEO,
Joseph Ratterman, stated the plan was “‘highly problematic’ and
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would ‘hurt’ investors by increasing costs and reducing options for
trading.” 155 The fear is that such a proposal will make trading more
expensive by driving order flow to exchanges and forcing brokers to
forego less expensive internalizations. Further, wholesalers represent a group that potentially stands to lose from the grand bargain. 156 Most of the orders that wholesalers execute are matched
from within their inventory; therefore, wholesalers may be impacted
by a trade-at rule that preferences trading on exchanges. 157 In fact,
KCG Holdings Inc., which has a wholesale business, stated that
“forcing more trading onto exchanges was an ‘elephant-gun approach motivated by commercial interests of a handful of market
participants.’” 158
C. Nasdaq’s Decreased Access Fee Program

Hope, supra note 61.
Hope, supra note 152.
Id.
Id.
Chen, supra note 107.
Id.
Id.
Here Is What You Need, supra note 68.
Id.
Id.
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Instead of using a trade-at rule to reduce off-exchange trading,
some market participants argue that reducing access fees is an effective means of driving order flow to exchanges. In February 2015,
Nasdaq began a program testing the effects of decreased access
fees on off-exchange stock trading. 159 Although various news
sources have cited Nasdaq as a proponent of the trade-at rule, its
program lacks a trade-at requirement. 160 The program is set to run
for a minimum of four months, and it lowers the cap on access fees
from the current thirty cents per 100 shares to five cents per 100
shares for fourteen stocks. 161 Nasdaq also lowers rebates to less
than five cents per 100 shares for these fourteen stocks. 162 Nasdaq
chose stocks that tend to trade in off-exchange venues at a higherthan-average rate. 163 Through this program, Nasdaq plans to evaluate the effect of decreasing access fees on off-exchange trading,
price discovery, trading costs, and liquidity. 164
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165. Id.
166. Pisani, supra note 75; Jed Horowitz, Trade Group SIFMA Names Ex-Senator Gregg
as CEO, REUTERS (May 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-sifma-greggidUSBRE94J0TX20130520.
167. Pisani, supra note 75.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Letter from Daniel Keegan, Managing Dir., Head of Equities for the Americas, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 7, 2014).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Stone, supra note 73.
174. Id.
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Nasdaq is acting without the support of other exchanges in implementing this program. 165 However, the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the largest securities industry trade group that represents asset managers and brokerage firms,
has voiced support for a decrease in access fees. 166 Similar to
Nasdaq, SIFMA supports a reduction of the cap on access fees from
thirty cents to five cents per 100 shares. 167 It contends that such a
reduction will make trading on exchanges less expensive and drive
more orders to exchanges. 168 Although this proposal may not be in
the best interest of SIFMA members who own dark pools, most
SIFMA members are not dark pool owners. 169
While not directly responding to Nasdaq’s pilot, Citigroup, a
large global bank with broker-dealer subsidiaries, submitted a comment to the SEC in support of a reduction in access fees without a
trade-at rule. 170 Citigroup called the trade-at rule a “sledgehammer
approach,” arguing that a reduction in access fees would naturally
draw more orders to exchanges. 171 Citigroup suggested different
access fees based on different variables such as the price, volume,
or market capitalization of a security. 172
Others market participants, however, contend that decreased
access are not enough to naturally shift order flow to exchanges.
Instead, there is a fear that lowering the cap on access fees will decrease liquidity on exchanges. 173 Because decreased access fees
translate into decreased rebates, liquidity providers may leave exchanges for venues with higher rebates. 174
Moreover, although SIFMA supports the idea behind Nasdaq’s
proposal to decrease access fees, it questions the validity of the
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data derived from the program. 175 Namely, because the decrease in
access fees only applies to transactions on Nasdaq, SIFMA does
not view the program as an accurate indicator of the effects of decreased access fees on the entire market. 176 SIFMA also argues
that it is impossible to separate access fees from other variables that
encourage market participants to post or remove liquidity for the
subject fourteen stocks. 177
D. BATS Exclusive Listings Proposal
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175. Letter from Theodore R. Lazo, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Couns., Sec. Indus. &
Fin. Mkts. Assoc., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 30, 2015)
(https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2014-128/nasdaq2014128-1.pdf).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. BATS
EXCH.,
BATS
FILES
EXCLUSIVE
LISTINGS
PROPOSAL
(2015),
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/press_releases/BATS-Exclusive-Listings-FINAL.pdf.
179. See Illiquid Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/i/illiquid
(last visited July 7, 2015).
180. See
Liquidity
Definition,
NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/l/liquidity (last visited July 3, 2015).
181. BATS EXCH., supra note 178.
182. Nicole Bullock, Bats Wants to Remove Illiquid Stocks from its Exchanges, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2015, 11:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/66d037fc-df06-11e4-b9ec00144feab7de.html#axzz3eqCvR7R4.
183. BATS EXCH., supra note 178.
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BATS filed the “BATS Exclusive Listings Proposal” on May 5,
2015 with the SEC, aiming to improve trading in thinly-traded securities. 178 Thinly-traded stocks are illiquid and thus tend to have low
trading volumes, limited numbers of interested buyers and sellers,
wider bid-ask spreads, and higher transaction costs. 179 In contrast,
liquid stocks tend to have high trading volumes, larger numbers of
interested buyers and sellers, narrower bid-ask spreads, and lower
transaction costs. 180 BATS’ proposal aims to focus displayed liquidity in thinly-traded stocks at one venue to “enable market participants
to more efficiently form prices” and to enable that venue to “be better
able to innovate [its] markets specifically for thinly-traded stocks.” 181
Accordingly, BATS would not offer trading in thinly-traded stocks;
instead, these stocks would trade on the exchange where they are
primarily listed. 182 BATS’ proposal applies to stocks whose average
daily trading volume (ADV) is lower than 2,500 shares, which means
the proposal would include about 700 stocks. 183
BATS is not a proponent of the trade-at rule, deeming it disruptive to U.S. market structure; however, it refers to this Exclusive List-
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189. Id.; Matt Levine, Who Cares What Apple’s Stock Price Is?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr.
25, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-25/who-cares-whatapple-s-stock-price-is.
190. Some Questions, supra note 188.
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ings Proposal as a “non-disruptive modification to U.S. equity market
structure that BATS, other exchanges and the industry at large can
implement with very little technical impact to the industry and its
many participants.” 184 Those in favor of BATS’ proposal praise it as
an “incremental change” that will not significantly disrupt market
structure. 185 They argue that concentrating liquidity, instead of dispersing it among various venues in a fragmented market, will increase price discovery and decrease transaction costs. 186
However, critics argue that without the other exchanges or dark
pools partaking in this proposal, unilateral action by BATS will be
ineffective. 187 Although BATS hopes that other venues will follow, an
SEC rule is necessary to force other venues to comply. 188 In addition, because the proposal does not discuss internalization and
lacks a trade-at rule, internalizing market makers, or trading firms
that fill investors’ orders from their own inventories rather than route
them to exchanges, could still trade the illiquid stocks in BATS’ proposal. 189 Namely, internalizing market makers could offer minimal
price improvement, as low as fractions of a penny, and jump ahead
of displayed liquidity. 190 For instance, the bid and offer of an illiquid
stock stands at $10.00 and $10.20, respectively, and an investor
posts an order to buy 500 shares at a price of $10.05 or better. 191
The bid and offer, respectively, are now at $10.05 and $10.20, and
an investor places an order to sell 500 shares immediately at the
best price available; an internalizing market maker can still jump
ahead of the $10.05 displayed bid and buy the stock for
$10.05001. 192 Here, the individual who narrowed the spread by moving the bid from $10.00 to $10.05 and contributed to the price discovery process was disadvantaged by the internalizing market
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maker who jumped ahead of his order. 193 This internalization issue
questions the effectiveness of BATS’ proposal.
E. No Trade-at Rule
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BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 3, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201306-04/stock-exchanges-seek-curbs-on-dark-pools-to-fight-exodus.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Finally, certain market participants oppose the trade-at rule and
argue that off-exchange trading has not reached a point where it is
harmful to investors and overall market quality. Managing director
Justin Schack of Rosenblatt Securities Inc., an institutional broker
that buys and sells stock for institutional investors, argues that research has not proven that increased off-exchange trading is
“measurably harming market quality” and that “[t]here is no guarantee we wind up in a better place” with a trade-at rule. 194 Additionally,
Larry Harris, a former chief economist at the SEC who now sits on
the board of a brokerage firm, made a similar point. 195 He contends
that there is insufficient evidence showing that the amount of dark
trading harms market quality. 196 In support, he states that transaction costs have decreased since 2004. 197 According to Harris, “exchanges are hurting in the sense that their market share is dropping
off, but the overall quality of the prices has not dramatically fallen
off.” 198
Moreover, other participants argue a trade-at rule will harm investors by forcing order flow to exchanges. Executives from Morgan
Stanley called the trade-at rule an “over-reaction,” arguing that it
takes away valuable options for customers looking to execute orders
at off-exchange venues. 199 The founder and CEO of TABB Group, a
research firm, argues that the trade-at rule will “benefit few and harm
many.” 200 He maintains that it has the potential to harm investors by
forcing transactions out of dark pools and onto exchanges. 201 Such
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a scenario can be detrimental to investors by enabling highfrequency traders to detect sizeable orders and front-run them. He
also argues that a trade-at rule can increase trading costs by forcing
brokers to give up less expensive internal executions. 202 Another
industry participant, KCG Holdings, argues that the trade-at rule is
“motivated by commercial interests of a handful of market participants.” 203
F. Canada and Australia’s Trade-At Rules

Id.
Hope, supra note 152.
CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS INST., supra note 76, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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Both Canada and Australia have recently implemented trade-at
rules, which have led to increased costs and minimal benefits. Canada implemented a trade-at rule in October 2012. At the time of enactment, Canada’s market already had a similar price-improvement
rule in place that prohibited internalization without price improvement. 204 The 2012 trade-at rule expanded the prior rule to cover
dark pools and mandated that they provide meaningful price improvement. 205
Canada’s trade-at rule was successful in decreasing the
amount of trading in dark pools; however, it failed to decrease trading costs and increase order posting in lit markets. For instance, the
market experienced a decline of twenty percent in dark trading volume. 206 However, investors were not more likely to post orders in lit
markets, like exchanges, under the new trade-at regime. 207 Additionally, bid-ask spreads widened after the trade-at rule’s adoption,
which signals increased trading costs. 208
Similarly, in May 2013, Australia introduced a trade-at rule to its
dark markets, forcing dark venues to provide price improvement or
send orders elsewhere. 209 The effects of the trade-at rule in Australia were similar to those in Canada. After the rule was adopted, Australian markets experienced a decrease in dark volume. 210 However,
spreads widened, indicating more expensive trading costs. 211 Again,
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the trade-at rule did not encourage the posting of liquidity in lit markets. 212 Thus, the trade-at rules implemented in Canada and Australia led to a decrease in off-exchange trading with minimal
improvement to market quality. 213
While the effects on Australia and Canada’s markets are noteworthy, it is important to consider that these markets differ significantly from the U.S. market. The U.S. has the largest stock market
in the world. 214 Canada and Australia are not close behind. As of
2014, the NYSE had a market capitalization of about $21 trillion and
Nasdaq had a market capitalization of about $7 trillion. 215 In contrast, Canada’s TMX group had a market capitalization slightly over
$2 trillion in 2014. 216 Meanwhile, the Australian Securities Exchange
(ASX) had a market capitalization of $1.5 trillion. 217 Thus, there is no
direct comparison between the U.S. and Canada or Australia’s market.
Nevertheless, the effects of the trade-at rule in Canada and
Australia provide valuable guidance for the U.S. in deciding whether
to implement a trade-at rule. Specifically, if a trade-at rule makes
trading more expensive by widening bid-ask spreads and fails to
draw more liquidity to exchanges, market structure is likely better
without such a rule.
III. THE MOST PROMISING PROPOSAL
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While it can be easy to find fault with the market, it is worth noting that market quality has improved. Research shows that investors
fare better in today’s fragmented stock market dominated by computer algorithms. 218 For example, despite the prevalence of HFT,
institutional investors enjoyed ten percent lower execution costs in
2013 than in 2006. 219 Transaction costs have fallen significantly
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since 2004. 220 Bid-ask spreads are also as narrow as ever for the
market as a whole. 221 These statistics show that today’s market
structure is not failing investors but allowing them to earn more from
their trades as a whole.
Nonetheless, problems including conflicts of interest associated
with maker-taker and lack of price discovery persist in today’s market. Trading costs may have decreased for investors overall but
there is potential for some market participants to benefit at the expense of others. For instance, brokers may benefit from offexchange trading by internalizing or routing orders based on fees
and rebates and copying publicly-available prices without contributing to price discovery.
Thus, a combination of factors taken from the proposals above
has the most potential to remedy issues associated with offexchange trading. This article advocates for a combination of a
trade-at rule, decreased cap on access fees, a variable access fee
and rebate schedule, and a block trading exemption. Such a proposal is most promising because it reduces the conflicts of interest
that brokers face, assuages the concern that brokers are subject to
unnecessary access fees, reduces information leakage, and promotes the price discovery process.
First, the trade-at rule in the finalized Tick Size Pilot has the potential to preference displayed liquidity. 222 Under this requirement, a
trading venue cannot execute from its own reserves without first
routing to venues with displayed quotations and taking out the
shares at the displayed quotation. 223 Accordingly, such a version of
the trade-at rule preferences displayed liquidity over non-displayed
liquidity, pushing orders to displayed market centers—such as exchanges—where they can aid in the price discovery process. 224 Additionally, it encourages aggressive quoting over passive price
matching, which can promote price competition and narrow
spreads. 225 Moreover, a trading venue displaying a protected quote

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 226 Side A

12/28/2015 14:43:02

14 ZYSKIND FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

IMPROVING MARKET EFFICIENCY

12/10/2015 11:35 AM

437

12/28/2015 14:43:02

226. Vingoe et al., supra note 110.
227. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
228. Id. at 2.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 226 Side A

can price match up to the number of shares displayed at the protected price. 226 Thus, ATSs can avoid trade-at routing obligations by
posting displayed, protected quotes and contributing to price discovery.
Second, the combination of the aforementioned trade-at rule
with decreased access fees ensures that a trade-at rule does not
subject brokers to costly fees while encouraging order flow to exchanges. Although a trade-at rule forces brokers to avoid certain
internal executions or off-exchange venues, it allows them to access
exchange liquidity at a lower cost. Thus, reduced access fees encourage brokers to execute on exchanges while ensuring that the
cost of foregone internalization or off-exchange execution is less
burdensome. Additionally, although decreased rebates could shift
orders away from exchanges, a trade-at rule in conjunction with deceased rebates is likely to shift order flow back to exchanges.
Indeed, implementing a combination of a trade-at rule and decreased cap on access fees is more efficient than implementing
each measure alone. Decreased access fees alone may not draw
trades to exchanges. Although brokers have less incentive to avoid
exchanges with reduced access fees, reduced access fees alone
may not stop participants from sending orders to off-exchange venues with even lower fees or higher rebates. Alternatively, a trade-at
rule without decreased access fees could increase trading costs by
forcing brokers to avoid less expensive execution venues. Brokers
are also likely to pass on such costs to investors.
Third, a reduction in access fees and rebates reduces conflicts
of interest for brokers. If access fees or rebates motivate a broker’s
choice in order execution venues, a broker may not act in the client’s
best interest. 227 In cases where brokers favor their own interest over
the customers’, customers face decreased execution quality. 228 Decreasing access fees and rebates would decrease conflicts of interest by giving brokers less incentive to avoid exchanges and to
preference internalization or ATSs. Although prohibiting the makertaker system would further remove such conflicts of interest, this
proposal advises lowering fees and rebates to study the impact on
the market before eliminating maker-taker.
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Fourth, imposing a variable access fee and rebate schedule on
different securities ensures that access fees and rebates drive orders to exchanges. Given the number of variables at play in the
market, it is likely that trading in certain stocks is not motivated by
access fees or rebates. In such cases, altering access fees and rebates will have little influence on a broker’s decision to send orders
to an exchange. However, access fees and rebates may play more
of a pivotal role in trading less liquid stocks. 229 Thus, a variable access fee and rebate schedule, which depends on the characteristics
of specific securities, is likely to have more success in moving order
flow to exchanges.
Fifth, an exception to the trade-at rule for block trading in dark
pools benefits institutional investors that seek to avoid front-running
by high-frequency traders. Dark pools are valuable to institutional
investors because they allow institutional investors to avoid alerting
high-frequency traders of their orders. 230 Thus, an exception for
block trading allows institutional investors to take advantage of the
benefits of dark pools. Moreover, forcing some block trades out of
dark pools and onto public exchanges places them at risk of information leakage, meaning that high-frequency traders can more easily detect a large order and front-run it. Thus, an exception for block
trading would allow institutional investors to avoid information leakage and enjoy the benefits of dark pools.
Moreover, this exception balances the need for anonymity with
the need for price discovery. Dark pools do not contribute to price
discovery because they do not publicize pre-trade information. 231
So, publicly posted prices may not be an accurate measure of the
market’s interest if a significant amount of trading takes places in
dark pools. 232 Exempting block trades rather than all dark trading
can aid the price discovery process by forcing more orders to exchanges without harming institutional investors.
Although BATS’ proposal is less costly and complex than the
trade-at rule, it concentrates on thinly traded stocks and does not
deal with internalizing market makers. While the issues surrounding
price discovery, transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, and liquidity may
be amplified for thinly traded stocks, they are not unique to them. A
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trade-at rule aims to tackle these issues across liquid and illiquid
stocks. Further, without a trade-at rule, internalizing market makers
can still trade illiquid stocks and, therefore, jeopardize the effectiveness of BATS’ proposal. 233 Internalizing market makers that jump
ahead of displayed liquidity and offer minimal price improvement
disadvantage investors who contribute to price discovery. 234 As
aforementioned, an internalizing market maker can jump ahead of a
displayed $10.05 bid to buy a stock for $10.05001, offering minimal
price improvement, while disadvantaging the investor that contributed to price discovery. 235 Given that as of March 2013, internalization
has made up about sixty percent of off-exchange trading, BATS’
proposal has the potential to exclude a significant amount of trading. 236
IV. METRICS FOR SUCCESS
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Both positive and negative effects can be linked to almost any
program. Often, market participants’ positions in the industry determine whether they view the effects as positive or negative. Thus, the
relevant question is whether the market is more efficient with or
without a trade-at rule targeted to decrease off-exchange trading.
This determination can best be done by studying empirical evidence,
namely the data from the aforementioned programs. Regulators can
effectively use such data to determine whether a program will increase market quality and should be implemented. This article proposes regulators look to market share, bid-ask spreads, and price as
measures of market quality. 237
First, market share is a useful indicator to determine whether
the trade-at rule achieves its goal of decreasing off-exchange trading and improving price discovery. Specifically, as mentioned above,
dark trading impairs the price discovery process. Thus, it is useful to
measure whether dark trading decreases with the implementation of
the trade-at rule. To prove useful, the trade-at rule must push some
dark trading to lit markets where it can contribute to price discovery.
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If dark trading decreases but does not shift to lit markets, the situation in the U.S. begins to resemble that of Canada and Australia
after the implementation of the trade-at rule. If dark trading does not
shift to lit venues, the market may experience less overall trading
volume. Such a scenario can subject investors to high price impact
when trading. 238 Investors prefer high trading volume, where it is
relatively easy to buy or sell a security, because a trade will have a
relatively minor impact on the stock price. 239 In contrast, when there
is less opportunity for orders to interact, investors face higher price
impact because variations in supply and demand can move the
market. 240
Second, bid-ask spreads are a useful measure of the success
of a trade-at rule. If stocks subject to a trade-at rule experience wider spreads, a trade-at rule makes the market less efficient. Investors
prefer narrow spreads to wide spreads. Wide spreads signify that
trading has become more expensive and buyers and sellers have to
concede more to enter or exit trades. 241 Accordingly, stocks with
narrow spreads are easier to trade since investors can generally
agree on the price.
Third, prices are an effective metric in determining whether the
market is better with a trade-at rule. Evaluating prices allows regulators to measure whether investors receive better executions under a
trade-at regime. For instance, if orders begin to execute at the midpoint of the best bid and ask prices under a trade-at rule, investors
may receive less price improvement. Additionally, if the trade-at rule
forces brokers to forego lower cost internal executions or higher
rebate venues, they may pass along excess costs to investors.
Thus, price serves as a useful indicator of how much investors gain
or lose as a result of the trade-at rule. Therefore, market share, bidask spreads, and price are valuable measures in determining
whether a trade-at rule has benefitted investors in the market.
Further, if implementing a program with a variable fee schedule,
it is worthwhile to determine which stocks are motivated by access
fees and rebates. Thus, appropriate fees can be implemented in
conjunction with a trade-at rule to decrease brokers’ costs and encourage more liquidity to exchanges. Regulators should pay special
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attention to stocks with unusually high levels of off-exchange trading
activity to determine whether a certain level of access fee or rebate
can influence their trading activity.
Therefore, evaluating a program’s effects on market share, bidask spreads, and price will test whether the market is more efficient
under a trade-at rule. Because industry participants have different
motivations, these metrics provide more objective indicators of market quality to determine whether the market is more efficient with a
trade-at rule.
CONCLUSION
Off-exchange trading accounts for a significant amount of the
market. Currently, forty percent of stock trading occurs in offexchange venues. While off-exchange trading can lower transaction
costs and offer price improvement, it can also pose conflicts of interest and harm price discovery. Therefore, this article advocates for
the implementation of a program that incorporates a trade-at rule,
decreased cap on access fees, variable access fee and rebate
schedule, and an exemption for block trades as a solution to the
negative effects associated with off-exchange trading. Empirical
evidence is crucial in measuring the success of this program. Accordingly, this article suggests measuring market share, bid-ask
spreads, and price to determine whether the current market is more
efficient with a trade-at rule.
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